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CHINA'S 21ST CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD: ANALYSIS OF THE PORT-PARK-CITY MODEL AT PERU'S CHANCAY PORT AND PAKISTAN'S GWADAR PORT

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Abstract

The Port-Park-City model is a Chinese infrastructure investment strategy designed to accelerate Beijing's geoeconomic competitive advantage over rivals in shipping and logistics along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The model reifies China's long-term dream to rejuvenate the ancient Silk Road and situate China as a global economic, financial, and digital powerhouse by 2049. This paper illustrates (a) how the Port-Park-City model works, (b) its rationale in two representative cases: Peru's Chancay Port and Pakistan's Gwadar Port, and (c) why the model is an attractive package for investors, port enterprises, trans-continental businesses, and politicians alike.

Keywords

China's New Silk Road, Belt and Road Initiative, 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,Port-Park-City Model, Port Planning and Development

I. Introduction

A key component of China's modern-day Silk Road is the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road* that connects a string of ports from China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Arctic Ocean. To date, the People's Republic of China has created an extensive, Sinocentric maritime network that includes more than 110 deep seaports in 67 countries in which Chinese firms construct, own, operate, and/or finance operations.

China recognizes stiff competition from global shippers and nautical logistics providers, notably Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) and Maersk. To ensure its maritime success, China has created a competitive advantage over its rivals by:

- becoming the world's largest ship builder;
- securing leadership positions in international maritime rule-setting organizations;
- constructing deep sea dual-use ports;
- employing sophisticated port engineering techniques to handle rising sea levels and other environmental threats;
- building roboticized high-bay storage facilities to expand logistics storage networks;

- constructing a digital infrastructure at its ports with 5G cellular service, fiber optic cables, satellite connectivity, and a universal operating system under China's Digital Silk Road; and
- negotiating Port-Park-City packages with host countries.

The Port-Park-City model is but one example of China's successful engagement with nations that are integral to its New Silk Road endeavor, begun in 2013 under the leadership of Xi Jinping. This paper examines the nascent Port-Park-City model and its implementation at two key Silk Road ports: Pakistan's Gwadar Port in South Asia and Peru's Chancay Port in South America.

The analysis and findings are organized as follows. Section II explains the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road* and its role in the broader New Silk Road initiative, now operational in 150 countries. Section III lays out the Port-Park-City model and rationale. Section IV identifies a key private for-profit, state-owned enterprise that is central to the Port-Park-City model: COSCO Shipping Line. Sections V and VI, respectively, analyze the model's application in Pakistan's Gwadar Port in South Asia and Peru's Chancay Port in South Asia, two representative cases. Section VII considers the mutually beneficial nature of the Port-Park-City model that, at once, helps partnering countries expand commerce while advancing the goals of China Dream to rejuvenate the ancient Silk Road.

II. China's Vision for the New Silk Road

The Belt and Road Initiative is China's dream to rejuvenate the ancient Silk Road, dating back to the Han Dynasty (207 BCE-220 CE) and the Tang Dynasty (618 CE-907 CE). The initiative was launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 with the aim of positioning China as a geopolitical, economic, digital, and financial powerhouse in the years to come.

The New Silk Road is comprised of four networked infrastructure routes. First is the *Silk Road Economic Belt*, a land-based route that includes thousands of miles of rail lines, highways, bridges, and tunnels that connect China with Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Europe, and Africa. Second is the *Digital Silk Road*, facilitating global communications connectivity and data reconnaissance via satellites, fiber optic cables, and communication networks. Third is the *Silk Road on Ice* through the Arctic Ocean to connect the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. Fourth is the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road*, which traverses the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Pacific Ocean, and Arctic Ocean.

Under the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road*, "Chinese firms now operate or have a financial stake in at least 129 ports outside of China and have spent at least $80 billion on port construction" (The Economist, 49). Building maritime routes and logistical support into the New Silk Road facilitates enhanced supply chains and expanded commerce, while leveraging China's geopolitical power. Since the launch of the New Silk Road, 150 countries have become official partners on China's New Silk Road.

Port projects are complex and multifaceted. Hence, China's President Xi Jinping makes careful strategic decisions when seeking maritime partners. One key deciding factor is location. New ports are built along busy shipping routes to ensure that many shippers will use Silk Road ports. With some 80% of the world's trade (by volume) traveling by sea today, China considers a new port's proximity to existing ports that could work in tandem as demand for ports rises and falls in the natural course of doing business.

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

China also selects port locations that could serve as a backup should a vulnerable chokepoint become inaccessible. This strategy allows ships to reroute to another port without a significant delay (Funaiole and Hillman). As this paper goes to press, the world is seeing China's port selection strategy play out as a result of blockages of the famed Strait of Hormuz chokepoint in the Persian Gulf.

Partnerships along the Belt and Road have helped boost trade relationships between countries since the New Silk Road began in 2013. Participating countries have witnessed benefits such as "growing cooperation in shipping, economic development, technological innovation, and cultural exchanges" (Weilan). Many countries are reliant upon China to modernize their ports, manage port operations, and sell needed ships, containers, and tracking software.

China's presence in the shipping industry continues to grow. The PRC is the world's largest ship builder due in large measure to the opportunities provided by the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road* (Runde, Hardman, and Bonin). China produces 95% of shipping containers. Zhenhus Heavy Industries manufactures some 70% of ship-to-shore cranes and automated machines to stack containers. Eighty-six ports in 24 countries uses China's LOGINK logistics-management software to track ship movement and cargo globally (The Economist, 50). Together, these elements demonstrate China's systemic approach to infrastructure development pieced together through its New Silk Road.

III. Port-Park-City Model

When China works with a partnering country to reconstruct a port, it sometimes offers a package called the Port-Park-City model. The "Port" may be a new, deepened, and/or expanded nautical port of call. The "Park" is an industrial area built around the port, many of which are classified as special economic zones. "City" refers to an urban area integrated into the port (by rail or highway) to help boost transnational commerce in the host country.

Politicians see the benefits of the package that China offers, especially when industrial parks and special economic zones promote short term domestic economic growth timed with re-elections. The package is also valuable to partnering countries because Chinese-built ports are able to handle large amounts of cargo thanks to state-of-the-art processes that quicken the loading and unloading of cargo. In

2019, most Chinese ports were capable of handling up to 242 million standard twenty-foot containers (or TUEs) annually (China Power). By 2025, average annual capacity reached 350 million TEUs (Qingrui and Jingyi). Chinese ports along the Maritime Silk Road are capable of handling products that require special care such as bulk goods, liquid natural gas, and oil.

One of China's first Port-Park-City investments was in Djibouti, a shipping gateway that connects Africa, Asia and Europe. Subsequent Port-Park-City developments can be found in Myanmar, Tanzania, Malaysia, Belarus, and beyond. It has proven to be a long term "ready-made template that has been exported to all parts of the world . . . serving as a foundational platform [that] facilitates industrial consolidation and fosters collaborative capacity, aligning seamlessly with the vision of international cooperation and global expansion championed by the Chinese government through the Belt and Road Initiative" (Shao, Li and Tian, 677, 679).

Port: Hotel Functions

China has modernized seaports to become full service. In addition to receiving, unloading and loading ships, modern cranes handle heavy weight bulk containers with ease. Multiple berths allow for more ships to unload and load simultaneously, resulting in greater cargo volumes and faster delivery times. In addition, Chinese-built ports offer merchant ships "hotel functions" such as ship repairs, electricity connections during port stays, wireless 5G (or 6G) network connectivity, food supply restocking, and short-term container storage on land. As a result, ships can stop at one place and secure a host of needed services before moving on to the next port of call, further expediting transportation times.

Park: Special Economic Zones

China first began building special economic zones in the 1980s along the southeast coast of China under party leader Deng Xiaoping to expand global trade. Today, China's partners are keen to build special economic zones (SEZ) into their Port-Park-City package to stimulate domestic business.

Special economic zones are beneficial in that they offer tax credits for domestic and foreign businesses that "allow foreign investments, money transfers, and building infrastructure" (Tranvik). SEZs are "special" because businesses operating in the zones do not pay tariffs on imports that move through the port. Since the launch of the New Silk Road, Chinese businesses have begun offshoring Chinese-owned factories into partnering country's SEZs to take advantage of both tax relief and proximity to modern Silk Road ports.

City: Urbanization

As China's maritime ports and connected industrial parks have taken hold, often partnering nations experience nearby population growth and urbanization in what may have once been a small fishing village. Workers often move closer to the port and SEZ to secure employment. As a result, local municipalities focus on the needs of people in the growing vicinity. Many of these areas are not well developed, so it leaves room for the Chinese to secure concessions to build housing, hotels, and businesses offices in the "City" part of the Port-Park-City package. What gets built in each city varies by locale, the needs of the surrounding port and industrial zone, and what local government officials envision for the area.

COSCO SHIPPING 中远海运集装箱运输有限公司 COSCO SHIPPING LINES CO., LTD.

IV. China Ocean Shipping Company

One of China's foremost for-profit businesses leading the Port-Park-City model under the New Silk Road is the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO). The firm has taken the lead for several reasons, not least of which is its ability to deliver on China's promise to Silk Road partnering nations that Chinese shippers will be dependable customers at newly rebuilt deep seaports along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

COSCO was established in 1961 when Chairman Mao Zedong wanted the People's Republic of China to have its own modern ocean shipping fleet, building on the ancient Maritime Silk Road during Imperial rule. By 1970, COSCO had expanded its fleet of ships to provide commercial transportation from

China to Europe, Japan, East Africa, the Red Sea, North America, the Persian Gulf, Bay of Bengal, Southeast Asia, and Australia (COSCO Shipping 2024).

To remain globally competitive, COSCO began to specialize in container transportation, bulk cargo, general cargo transportation, international freight, and hotel functions. By growing its fleet and transportation capabilities, the firm made it onto the Fortune Global 500 List in 2008, ranking 488. In 2016, COSCO and China Shipping merged to become COSCO Shipping Lines with 1,535 vessels and 68 terminals that it manages, partly owns, and/or has constructed (COSCO Shipping 2024).

COSCO is a state-owned enterprise (SOE), meaning a private Chinese for-profit business that partners with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). SOEs function as standard business enterprises but incur special benefits because of their alliance with the Chinese government. For example, a member of the CCP might sit on COSCO's Board of Directors, which grants multiple advantages such as the ability to secure licensing approvals faster than non-SOEs, a higher probability of winning government contract bids, and easier access to loans from state-owned banks (Gang and Hope).

SOEs play a role in China's Centralized-Decentralized Economic model whereby the CCP sets national policies and projects, and Chinese businesses (SOEs and non-SOEs) execute said polices and projects. As a state-owned enterprise, COSCO Shipping Lines has the added advantage of building many of the ports along the Belt and Road.

COSCO has successfully expanded its enterprise across the globe. In 2025, COSCO had part or majority ownership rights in nine ports (Liu). It is estimated that between 2010 and 2019, COSCO and their primary competitor China Merchants Group combined, invested some $11 billion into overseas ports (China Power).

The following section examines China's Port-Part-City model in two official partnering nations on the New Silk Road: the Pakistani Port of Gwadar in the Eastern Hemisphere and the Peruvian Port of Chancay in the Western Hemisphere.

V. Gwadar Port in Pakistan

President Xi Jinping first visited Pakistan in 2015 when Pakistan became one of the first official partners on China's New Silk Road under an all-weather strategic cooperation. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Xi signed 51 memoranda of understanding to begin projects ranging from power plants to new roads, dams, rail lines, industrial zones, farms, airports, pipelines, ports, surveillance systems, and more.

The so-called "Iron Brothers" were ready to deepen their geopolitical and economic partnership that for more than 50 years was romantically depicted as a friendship that is "higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the ocean, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel" (Markey, 46). Pakistan played a role in leading the Nixon administration's opening in China in 1972. In return, China helped avert wars between India and Pakistan.

At the heart of the Silk Road agreement was expansion of the Gwadar Port, strategically located at the confluence of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Already, the iron brothers had worked together on phase one to transform the small fishing village of Gwadar into a deep seaport, completed in 2007. Phase two was successfully negotiated in April of 2015. The plan aimed to expand the Gwadar Port and start building a 3,000km "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" (CPEC), linking the sea-based and land-based routes of the New Silk Road.

China promised $46 billion to build the new infrastructure, a daunting task given that the Khunjerab Pass at the Chinese border is over 4,700-meters high and largely impassable for the better half of the year. Nonetheless, the Chinese promised funds in the form of direct investments and concessional loans to be repaid by the Pakistani government. CPEC has grown into a vast network of highways, railways, power plants, industrial zones, and energy pipelines that connect the Arabia Sea at the southern end of the corridor with the Chinese city of Kashgar at the northern end.



China's initial $46 billion commitment later rose to $67 billion, the largest to any single Silk Road partnering nation. It was agreed in 2017 that China would be given administrative rights to the port, and that "91 percent of profits from Gwadar port would flow to China over the forty years . . . the other 9 percent would go to Pakistan's federal government" (Markey, 5). The Chinese negotiated a 40-year port lease with Pakistan (from 2017 to 2057), granting further security of China's Silk Road investments in neighboring Pakistan.

In *China's Asian Dream*, Tom Miller notes that "government officials working on the Belt and Road project [in Pakistan] privately admit they expect to lose 80% of their investment in Pakistan," suggesting China's massive investment was "actually a form of bribe" to help expand its geopolitical influence in South Asia (Miller, 176).

Port: Capabilities

The Gwadar Port is a deep-sea, warm water port that allows large ships to anchor at ease. A Roll-on/Roll-off terminal contains ramps that directly connect with ships to facilitate loading and unloading of cargo on wheels (e.g., tractors, automobiles). There are three multipurpose berths that span 602 meters to accommodate large ships (Ali, Sabir, Amjad, Najam, Shafiq). There is a 100-meter service berth built for ships to be restocked and/or repaired. One of Gwadar's bulk terminals has the capacity to handle 100,000 dead weight tonnage (DWT), exceeding the standard 25,000 DWT weight capacity.

Park: Infrastructure

Surrounding the Gwadar Port is an industrial park classified as a special economic zone, spanning 2,293 acres (Ali, Sabir, Amjad, Najam, Shafiq). China's main focus for this industrial park is to attract businesses in the textile, engineering, pharmaceutical, and information technology industries (Khan and Khan). The park also houses a Chinese-built desalination plant that turns salt water into drinking water to support port functions, ships, manufacturing facilities, and office parks.

City: Tourism

Gwadar Port is located in the province of Balochistan, once a small fishing community. The expansion of the Gwadar Port over the past decade and the creation of a small city around it has led to an increase in tourism. A new 3,000-acre Gwadar International Airport opened on January 20, 2025, which is now the second largest airport in Pakistan. China's Ministry of Commerce initially loaned the Government of Pakistan $95.19 million for the airport project, a figure that rose to $243 million by 2025 (AidData). Gwadar is home to new resorts, leisure centers, and transit systems

Current Status

Despite all these projects, the people in Balochistan continue to view Beijing's forays into Pakistan as a new chapter of exploitation. When construction of the CPEC began, locals were promised schools, hospitals, and better roads by the Chinese, which have still not been built. Fishing is the main source of income for local families, but many residents fear that maritime traffic will disrupt the fishing industry (Rahman, Ishaq, Naeem). A desalination plant was built to help supply fresh water, but clean water is still in short supply for local residents. This has led to the Pakistanis protesting projects and opposing further construction. When the Gwadar International Airport was to open in 2025, the Pakistanis formed a sit-in protest. This led to government militants killing 70 people and authorities reviewing security risks in the region before opening the airport.

Notably, since the opening of phase one of the Gwadar Port in 2007, the port has logged only 22 ships in its best year, failing to attract regularly scheduled shipping lines (Schacht). Who then benefits from the Gwadar Port expansion and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor? In the eyes of Xi Jinping, several factors may be at play, reflecting his private admission at the start of the New Silk Road that the People's Republic of China expected to lose 80% of their investments in Pakistan (Miller, 176).

The potential benefits to China of its Pakistani investments are numerous, although not always on display to foreigners. First is location. The port provides the Chinese with a permanent maritime base in the Arabian Sea along the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road*, that is now firmly connected with its land-based *Silk Road Economic Belt*. Ships delivering crude oil from the Gulf to China can bypass the narrow sea-lane at the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia and, instead, deliver oil to the Gwadar Port to be shipped through connected pipelines along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor directly into mainland China.

This new supply route through Pakistan is valuable for the Chinese given that some 80% of China's oil is imported through the Strait of Malacca, a critical nautical chokepoint that could easily be blocked for military purposes. Having direct access to the Arabian Sea allows supply chains to continue to move regardless of blockages near the South China Sea.

A second benefit is linked to China's Digital Silk Road, a recently developed Silk Road route. The *Pakistan East Africa Connecting Europe* (PEACE) cable is an undersea fiber optic data cable that provides 5G communication between 78 countries (Hawkins). The PEACE cable is the first subsea data cable that connects the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa. The cable's maritime landing station is at Port of Gwadar, hence the port's added value for China's telecommunications industry, well beyond its port functions.

A third benefit was revealed in September 2025 when China and Pakistan decided to create a "China-Gwadar-Africa Shipping Corridor" under a five-year (2025-2029) maritime action plan" (Shah). Gwadar may become a regional economic trading hub for Eurasia Central Asia, Afghanistan, and West Asia, another infrastructural breakthrough for global commerce.

Given the multi-faceted importance of Pakistan as a key part of China's New Silk Road, it is no wonder that in 2025, Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ishaq Dar met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to pledge new projects along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) backed by an additional $8.5 billion in Chinese investment funds (AP News). The new projects were solidified during a three-day trip to Hangzhou, China by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif during which the Chinese Foreign Ministry marked the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations with Pakistan by introducing phase two of CPEC (CPEC 2.0) to include more offshoring of Chinese industries and manufacturing to Pakistan and co-developments in technology, e-commerce, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy essential for mutual prosperity (The Express Tribune).

VI. Chancay Port in Peru

The Chancay Port in Peru represents China's recent efforts to expand the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road* into Latin America. This is a bold and expensive move on the part of the People's Republic of China. Located on the Pacific Ocean, the PRC selected COSCO to build a new port in Peru and to expand China's network of maritime capabilities. President Xi Jinping inaugurated the Port of Chancay on November 24, 2024, the year in which China became the biggest trading partner in South America.

In a previously unthinkable decision, in May 2024, "Peruvian lawmakers passed legislation granting [COSCO] exclusive rights to operate Chancay" against Peru's sovereignty over its own ports (Daniels). Having invested $1.3 billion to construct the port, COSCO Shipping Line maintains 60% ownership of the port with no contractual termination date set. The Peruvian miner, Volcan Compañía Minera S.A.A., owns the remaining 40%. Peru granted COSCO a 30-year lease on the Port of Chancay, extendable for another 30 years.

The Chancay mega-port is critical to shortening the nautical travel time between China and South America from an average of 35 days to now between 23 to 25 days by avoiding stopovers in Mexico and California.

Port: Capabilities

The natural deep-water Port of Chancay spans 1,500 meters with four operational berths, two for container ships and two for multi-purposes (COSCO Press Release). Upon completion of phase two of construction, the port will have 15 berths capable of accommodating larger vessels in its deep waters. Chancay is the only port on the Pacific coast of South America that can receive 20,000 TEU ships (20ft-equivalent units).

The port contains Roll-on/Roll-off ramps to allow faster loading and unloading of automotive cargo. The port uses all electric autonomous container trucks to decrease energy consumption (Prevljak). These trucks do not have human operators, but rather, advanced sensors and learning algorithms recognize obstacles and plan routes to avoid collisions. Digitized telecommunication systems and facial recognition software run on Huawei 5G internet towers to connect all cranes, trucks, equipment, and workers at the port (Cervilla). Its storage yards, warehouses, and logistics centers can handle 6 million tons of bulk cargo and 160,000 vehicles a year.

Park: Infrastructure

In June 2024, Peru's President Dina Boluarte announced Chancay as the fifth special economic zone in Peru called the Industrial Park of Ancón (EC Editorial Staff). The PIA will help increase economic development by granting tax benefits to businesses that invest in the Chancay region, home to one-fifth of the world's oil reserves and a quarter of critical metals such as lithium, silver, copper, and magnesium. The region is also agriculture heavy, exporting most of Latin America's soybeans and meat (GRAIN).

The Peruvian government envisions creating a major logistics and trans-shipment hub linking the Industrial Park of Ancón with the Port of Chancay, the Port of Callao, and the Jorge Chávez International Airport**.** The SEZ will be built on 1,338 hectares of land that allows space to integrate manufacturing, warehousing, and transportation services for an array of industries (Barzola).

The complex will host industrial development for West-bound exports through the Pacific Ocean and East-bound exports across the middle of South America to the Atlantic Ocean. President Xi Jinping is in conversation with South American leaders, including President Boluarte in Peru and President Lula de Silva in Brazil, to design and construct a 3,000km cargo railway called the Central Bio-Oceanic Railway Corridor (CBRC). Backed by Chinese investments and engineering firms, the rail line will ultimately connect Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile (Hanbury).

Having a land-based route across South America will reduce reliance on shipping through the Panama Canal and other chokepoints for freight forwarders, third-party logistics providers, and shippers. China also envisions the Bio-Oceanic Corridor facilitating raw material extraction from resource-rich nations in South America. President Xi Jinping called the Bi-Oceanic Corridor the "Great Inca Trail," referring to a 15th century mountain network that joined the Inca empire (Baptista, Aquino and Elliott).

City: Potential Urbanization

The current population within the district of Chancay is about 63,400 people, a number that is expected to grow to 216,000 people over the next decade. The 2024-2034 Urban Development Plan for Chancay details the country's aim to transform the Chancay area into a small urban city. Plans include expanded housing, transportation and municipal services.

Nearby ecological zones and wetlands, however, bring fear to many locals about potential environmental disruptions. Increased pollution from large ships and increased highway and railroad traffic could potentially harm the many birds and diverse ecosystem that surrounds the area of Chancay (Cervilla).

VII. Conclusions

The Port-Park-City model represents a unique infrastructure package that China offers to select partnering countries on the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road*. Not only does the package include construction of state-of-the-art seaports, but also the creation of industrial zones that are integrated into coastal cities to promote regional economic growth and development. China is highly strategic when selecting Silk Road partners and presents the Port-Park-City model as a mutually beneficial, win-win investment option.

Pakistan's Gwadar Port illustrates that port functions are not always the most valuable aspect of the Port-Park-City package. The Gwadar Port's strategic location along the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road* helps fulfill China's desire to build logistical backdoors into the Belt and Road that can bypass nautical chokepoints, which explains why "more than a third of Chinese overseas ports are near maritime chokepoints" (The Economist). The Chinese-built Gwadar tax-free special economic zone surrounding the deep seaport also promotes the offshoring of Chinese businesses.

Construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from the Port of Gwadar to Xinjiang, China, allows the Chinese to transport cargo directly from the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road* to the land-based *Silk Road Economic Belt*. Gwadar Port is also the base station for the PEACE fiber optic data cable that digitally connects Asia, Europe and Africa under the *Digital Silk Road*. As long-term thinkers, each piece of China's Belt and Road serves multiple purposes in its seven-continent infrastructure puzzle.

In Peru, China has opened a door into the heart of South America for the People's Republic of China through an extension of its *21st Century Maritime Route*. China's ambitions are manifest: In 2025, President Xi Jinping announced plans to explore the possibility of extending the New Silk Road from the western Port of Chancay in Peru across the South American continent to the eastern Port of Ilhéus in Brazil. The rail route through the Andes Mountains and the Amazon Forest is tentatively called the Central Bi-Oceanic Corridor because it would connect the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans by land. If built, the Central Bi-Oceanic Corridor will offer cargo shippers a way to bypass transiting through the Panama Canal, hence mirroring the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor's ability to bypass the Strait of Malacca, if needed.

China will likely continue to offer the Port-Park-City model to partnering countries not only because it is well received by partnering nations but also because the model aligns with the goals of China Dream (*zhongguo meng*) to rejuvenate the ancient Silk Road and to become become a global economic, financial, digital, and geopolitical power by 2049. China will most likely continue to expand projects across the globe through the New Silk Road. Thus, it is valuable for global businesses to keep abreast of what is happening with China's New Silk Road to get a glimpse into what the future of transportation supply chains and logistics may look like in the near term.

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